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During the first week of December, the U.S. President brought together the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace agreement. The commitment involved an end to years of warfare in the volatile eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations “to make a lot of money”.

Not long after, however, a completely opposite approach to conflict emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, hitting sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President stated, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Strategic Pivot

This dichotomy highlights the central feature of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a de-emphasis from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on economic deals and conflict resolution—though how this squares with the emerging aerial operations in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a mantra we’ve seen thrown around for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” stated a senior U.S. state department official on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential representative reinforced this, saying the President “has treated Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Contradictions

This shift is consequential, but observers caution it is too soon to gauge its impact. The approach is intertwined with the President’s direct manner, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented an analyst for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research predicts this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Geopolitical Neglect and Friction

Unlike his recent predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most infamous foray into African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later admitted using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant feud has developed with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa resonates strongly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Diplomacy and Conditional Action

A similar confrontation emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the forceful rhetoric may have spurred the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had authorized the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Competitors

Observers characterize the new U.S. approach as similar to that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on commercial interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the new approach likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about isn't about spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.